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Abstract 
Recent advances have highlighted the evolutionary significance of female competition, 
with the sexes pursuing different competitive strategies and females reserving their 
most intense competitive behaviors for the benefit of offspring (1-3).  Influential 
economic experiments using cash incentives, however, have found evidence suggesting 
that women have a lower desire to compete than men (4-7). We hypothesize that the 
estimated gender differences critically depend on how we elicit them, especially on the 
incentives used. We test this hypothesis through an experiment with adults in China 
(n=358). Data show that, once the incentives are switched from monetary to child-
benefitting, gender differences disappear. This result suggests that female competition 
can be just as intense as male competition given the right goals, indicating important 
implications for policies designed to promote gender equality.  
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Significance Statement 
 
Despite Darwin’s recognition of the importance of intra-sexual competition, the topic 
of female competition has been largely ignored. Economists, looking for reasons why 
women are rarely found in top jobs, have accumulated experimental evidence 
pointing to women’s lower desire to compete than men. Consistent with newer 
interdisciplinary hypotheses about female competition, our experimental results show 
that women can compete as much as men once we change the experimental reward 
medium to something more in line with women’s goal: the benefit of one’s children. 
Our results have important policy implications: a change in the workplace incentive 
structure could induce more women to enter workplace competitions. Such findings 
matter for a broader group of scientists including biologists, anthropologists, 
psychologists, economists and sociologists. 
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Following pioneering works by Hrdy and Clutton-Brock, significant advances in 
evolutionary biology, psychology and anthropology have produced an important body of 
knowledge on the occurrence and evolutionary significance of female competition (1-3, 8-
9). Despite Darwin’s recognition of the importance of intra-sexual competition, male-male 
and female-female competition for resources and sexual reproduction (10), most 
subsequent work has focused on the mechanisms and consequences of male competition. 
From an evolutionary perspective, variance in female reproductive outcomes (especially 
given the successful spread of monogamous marriage norms which reduces sex differences 
in the opportunity for sexual selection (8-9, 11)) implies that men and women have been 
subject to similarly intense selection pressures (1, 12). If competitive traits derive from 
selection pressures, then men and women should each have evolved competitive traits. 
Recently, important studies have laid the foundation for understanding the difference in 
competitive strategies pursued by the sexes and, in particular, found that females reserve 
their most intense competitive behaviors for the benefit of offspring (3, 9, 12). The goal of 
this paper is to contribute new behavioral evidence to the study of the different modalities 
of women’s competition.  
Economists have long observed that sex differences in behavior exist and have 
consistently documented a gender gap in the desire to compete (5, 13). In the standard 
experimental design on selection into competitive environments, men and women are given 
a series of computational tasks under different payment conditions, and then asked to 
choose the preferred payment method for a subsequent task (4). Despite the lack of a 
gender difference in performance, when offered the choice to be paid on a tournament 
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payment scheme or a non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme, men usually choose 
tournament significantly more often than women. Controlling for confidence and risk 
aversion does not explain away the gender gap in choosing tournament. Numerous 
subsequent studies have replicated this finding, in the lab and in the field, and have 
explored possible ways to encourage women to choose tournament, such as affirmative 
action or varying the characteristics of the task or of the competition (5, 14-17). Adding to 
the more traditional explanations for gender differences in labor market outcomes (i.e. 
gender differences in human capital accumulation (18) and gender discrimination (19)), this 
finding contributes a more direct behavioral explanation to the puzzle of why women are 
scarce in top-ranking professional positions: women simply do not select into competitive 
environments as much as men do because they are lacking in competitive behavioral traits.  
Despite how pervasive this idea has become, it has not found unequivocal support in labor 
market data (20). 1  A better understanding of the mechanism behind gender differences in 
competitive behaviour would allow for targeted policy in addressing labor market 
inequality. 
In light of the evolutionary evidence, we hypothesize that the nature of the reward 
used in economic experiments can induce gender differences in behavior by turning on 
gender specific tendencies to participate in a given sphere of competition, but these 
tendencies are not necessarily indicative of general competitiveness. We propose that 
women are not necessarily less competitive than men, especially in those spheres of 
                                                
1 In particular, the data show that the gender wage gap is smallest not in the least competitive jobs, but in the 
jobs with the most flexibility.   
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competition that really matter to them.  Despite cash being the standard reward medium,2 in 
competitive environments it could interact with deep-seated gender differences in mating 
strategies and weaken women’s tendency to compete and/or strengthen men’s. 
Psychologists have shown that women find cues to resource acquisition such as earning 
capacity (here winning a large cash prize) more attractive in a prospective mate than men 
do (21).  Traits related to ability to successfully compete over such resources do not appear 
to be highly ranked by men as desirable female characteristics, which could contribute to 
making men more competitive than women over these cash resources. On the contrary, 
given the different and more important role that mothers play in infant survival (22), and 
the high costs associated with violence (12), females reserve their most intense competitive 
behavior to ensure their reproductive success, i.e., the survival and thriving of their 
offspring (3, 9, 12).  Therefore, we expect that women will be relatively more competitive 
for resources that directly benefit one’s offspring than for a cash prize. 
From an economic perspective, women’s lower competitive instincts over cash 
stakes, which could be used in turn to buy child-benefitting resources, would be consistent 
with a relaxation of the hypothesis of perfect rationality in favor of seemingly less rational 
yet still predictable behaviors rooted in social norms rather than market norms (23). For 
example, emerging evidence showing that tendencies to compete are reversed in matrilineal 
and matrilocal societies (24) and that girls in single-sex schools are as competitive as boys 
(25) suggests that nurture/culture plays an important role in contributing to the gender 
specific competitive tendencies over cash stakes. Nature may play a role as well, as female 
                                                
2 It satisfies the three principles of non-satiation, salience and dominance (Economics Lab, by Friedman and 
Cassar, Routledge, 2004).  
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competitiveness over cash seem to vary with hormone levels (26, 27), and post-menopausal 
women are found to be more competitive than younger women (28). 
To test our hypothesis, we designed an experiment in which subjects perform tasks 
and choose between piece-rate and tournament payment schemes (as in the standard 
protocol for eliciting competitive preferences) under two reward treatments: cash (the 
standard medium to incentivize participants in economic experiments) and a prize intended 
to benefit one's child (novel treatment) - a scholastic bookstore voucher with equal face 
value as the cash reward corresponding to performance in the experimental task.  
The experimental design is within-subject. Each session consisted of six different 
rounds: the first four, administered in random order between sessions, were different 
treatments of a game designed to elicit a subject’s desire to compete; the last two were a 
risk aversion elicitation task and a willingness to pay (WTP) elicitation task. The desire to 
compete elicitation task, with reward rules specific to each treatment, required subjects to 
add sets of five two-digit numbers, as many as possible in three minutes  (such as 78 + 23 + 
69 + 35 + 10 =?). The number of correct solutions, our performance measure, was recorded 
as the subject’s score. At the end of each round the subjects were notified of their own 
performance but not what other subjects scored. At the end, subjects received a 25RMB 
show-up fee plus additional payments depending on the performance score of the round 
randomly selected for payment, on average an additional 17.64RMB. 
Rounds 1 and 2.  
Piece-Rate (pr). To estimate a benchmark measure of gender difference in performance, 
and replicate standard protocol, we implemented a non-competitive treatment: a piece-rate 
payment scheme in which every subject received 2RMB per correct answer.  
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Tournament (tr). Subjects were required to participate in a compulsory tournament in 
which the reward was 4RMB for each correct answer, but only if the subject scored higher 
than a randomly matched anonymous opponent (another subject in the experiment, of 
unknown gender). With ties, winners shared the payment equally.  
Rounds 3 and 4.  
Choice-Cash (cc). Subjects had to choose under which payment scheme their next 
performance should be compensated: piece-rate (2RMB per correct answer) or tournament 
(4RMB per correct answer if score higher than the opponent, nothing otherwise).3  The 
three treatments described above are identical to the standard protocol in the literature. 
Choice-Voucher (cv). Similar to Choice-Cash, this treatment also required subjects to 
choose between the two types of compensation schemes. The only difference, giving us our 
comparison of interest, was that the compensation reward was not cash, but a bookstore 
voucher of equal face value.  
While Rounds 3 and 4 always followed Rounds 1 and 2, the treatment order within 
the two blocks was randomly assigned to sessions, thus the four treatment order 
combinations were pr-tr-cc-cv, tr-pr-cc-cv, pr-tr-cv-cc, and tr-pr-cv-cc. See Table S2 for a 
balance check of the counter-balanced design and characteristics of the participants facing 
each order combination. 
After the first four rounds, subjects were asked to guess their opponent’s score in 
the compulsory tournament.  The difference between their own score and their guess of 
                                                
3 As in (4), if a subject choose tournament, her score was compared to the score of her opponent in the 
compulsory tournament round, rather than their opponent’s score in Choice-Cash to ensure that participants 
choosing the tournament option are competing against the scores of others also performing under the 
tournament condition, so to rule out reasons for choosing the piece-rate scheme such as not wanting to impose 
negative externality on others or strategic response to beliefs about other participants’ choices. 
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their opponent’s score is used to proxy for their confidence in winning the tournament.  
Round 5: Risk Tolerance – To estimate a subject’s risk attitude, we administered the 
Multiple Price List (MPL) elicitation method with real payoffs (reported in SI 5).  
Round 6: Willingness to Pay – To estimate how much each individual valued the voucher, 
we used a procedure similar to the previous MPL (reported in SI 5).  
Survey Instruments. At the end, subjects were asked to answer demographic and socio-
economic questions, as well as a series of questions about their beliefs (see SI 6).  
The sample pool is comprised of 358 parents (173 fathers, 185 mothers) of middle 
and high school students recruited through seven educational institutions throughout 
Shanghai, China, between June and August of 2012, who participated in 18 experimental 
sessions lasting 45-60 minutes each. In addition to written instructions, to ensure 
consistency, prevent framing and other uncontrolled biases, instructions were voice 
recorded in Mandarin and played back. Solutions were recorded on paper by the 
participants and immediately graded by research assistants. Table S1 displays the 
participants’ summary characteristics. 
The importance placed by Chinese culture on education made it highly likely that 
parents would use the scholastic voucher to purchase something for the child, as we 
intended. In China, educational textbooks and “learning aids” make up an unusually high 
market share of the publishing industry, accounting for 65% of all turnover.4 We further 
substantiate our claim by interviewing teachers and parents. Shanghai teachers in focus 
                                                
4 See Buchinformtaionszentrum’s 2014 report, funded by the German Federal Foreign Office: 
http://www.buchmesse.de/images/fbm/dokumente-ua-pdfs/2014/china_buchmarkt_en_2014_44724.pdf .  It 
further finds that of the top ten Chinese book publishers, seven are in the education sector, including the top 
four publishers. 
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groups were unanimous in their belief that parents would only use the vouchers to buy 
educational books for their children, in particular test preparation books.  Parents agreed 
with the teachers: we conducted a study with a convenience sample of 72 parents of high 
school students around Shanghai (with no overlap with the experimental sample) in which 
we handed out 20RMB bookstore vouchers identical to those used in the experiment. When 
asked how they would use the voucher, 85% indicated they would use it for their child.  
There was no gender difference (mothers: 83%, n=42; fathers: 87%, n=30; p-value of 
difference = 0.703). 
 With respect to performance, i.e. the number of correct answers, women on average 
scored significantly higher than men in the compulsory treatments of the first two rounds 
(8.14, 7.03, p=0.003 in Piece-Rate; 7.64, 6.66, p=0.009 in Tournament), marginally higher 
in Choice-Cash (9.39, 8.67, p=0.069), and higher, but not significantly so, in Choice-
Voucher (9.18, 8.65, p=0.199). See Figure 1-Panel A. Within gender, improvements in 
scores from the first two rounds to the next two were statistically significant (p=0.000 male; 
p=0.000 female) consistent with learning effects. There were no statistically significant 
gender differences in risk tolerance (10.82, 10.26, p=0.528) or in willingness to pay for the 
voucher (10.39, 10.72, p=0.682). Men and women were equally underconfident, guessing 
that their opponents would answer one more question correctly than they themselves did (-
1.30, -1.25, p=0.933). See Figure 1-Panel B. 
11 | P a g e  
 
A  
B  
Figure 1-Panel A. Task performance. Bars represent average number of correct problems solved 
by male (blue) and female (red) subjects by treatment. Error bars represent mean +/- SE. Women, 
on average, scored significantly higher than men in the two compulsory treatments (8.14, 7.03, 
p=0.003 in Piece-Rate; 7.64, 6.66, p=0.009 in Tournament), marginally higher in Choice-Cash  
(9.39, 8.67, p=0.069) and not significantly higher in Choice-Voucher (9.18, 8.65, p=0.199). 
Figure 1-Panel B. Preferences and beliefs. On average, men are willing to pay 10.26RMB and 
women 10.82RMB for a lottery with an expected value of 15RMB (p=0.528), and 10.72RMB and 
10.39RMB respectively for a bookstore voucher of 20RMB face value (p=0.682). On average, both 
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men and women guessed that their opponent would answer one more question than they did 
(p=0.933. Men guessed 7.91 while their average score was 6.66; women guessed 8.92, while their 
average score was 7.64). 
 
Our preliminary results are displayed in Figure 2. Under Choice-Cash (cash 
treatment), in the voluntary tournament with cash as the prize, the gender difference in 
choosing the tournament payment scheme is statistically significant at the 5% level 
(tournament entry rate among women and men, respectively: 0.26, 0.36, p=0.043), with 
men 9.89 percentage points more likely to enter the tournament, despite scoring lower than 
women in the compulsory cash tournament. Under Choice-Voucher (voucher treatment), in 
the voluntary tournament with the bookstore voucher as the prize, there are no gender 
differences in the tournament entry rate (0.31, 0.31, p=0.978). Compared to the cash 
treatment, men reduced their willingness to compete from 0.36 to 0.31 (p=0.131), about the 
same amount for which women increased their willingness to compete (from 0.26 to 0.31, 
p=0.105, marginally significant). 
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Figure 2. Tournament entry decision. Bars display the proportion of men (blue) and 
women (red) choosing to enter the tournament under Choice-Cash and Choice-Voucher. 
Error bars represent mean +/- SE. Under Choice-Cash, the 10 percentage point gender 
difference in tournament entry is significant (men: 0.36, women: 0.26, p=0.043) but it 
disappears under Choice-Voucher (men: 0.31, women: 0.31, p=0.978). 
 
 Next, we test for gender differences using separate probit regressions for the cash 
and voucher treatments, controlling for a set of explanatory variables highlighted in the 
literature as possible causes of the gender gap in tournament entry: risk tolerance, 
confidence and probability of winning the tournament, as proxied by performance in the 
compulsory tournament. See Table 1. The voucher treatment regressors also include the 
willingness to pay for the voucher (WTP), to control for the stakes size variation induced 
by heterogeneity in individual valuations. In all models, the coefficient on Female is the 
one of interest, and can be interpreted as the residual gender difference in willingness to 
compete after controlling for these explanatory variables. In the cash treatment, a woman is 
about 12 percentage points (SE=0.049) less likely to enter the competition than a man with 
.1
.2
.3
.4
Cash Treatment** Voucher Treatment
Male Female +/- SE
Proportion Choosing Tournament
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the same compulsory tournament score, risk tolerance, and confidence.  This result is 
consistent with existing literature. Once the tournament prize is changed to the child-
benefiting voucher, the gender coefficient becomes insignificant and close to zero in all 
specifications.  
  
Table 1. Tournament entry decision. Probit regression: dependent variable = 1 if subject chooses 
to enter competition, 0 otherwise.  Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.                           
 
Our main results, shown in Table 2, pool the data from the cash and voucher 
treatment to formally test for the significance of the gender-treatment interaction.  We take 
advantage of the power of our within-subject design by including individual fixed effects, 
which allows us to measure the rate by which women, relative to men, are more willing to 
compete in the voucher treatment compared to the cash treatment, controlling for all 
individual heterogeneity that is constant across treatments, such as performance in the 
Table&1:&Tournament&Entry&Decision&5&by&Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.099** -0.122** 0.001 -0.019 -0.015
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Score 0.014 0.020** 0.020**
666(in6compulsory6tournament) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Risk6Tolerance 0.007** 0.005* 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Confidence 0.015** 0.007 0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Willingness6to6Pay66for6Voucher6 0.008**
(0.003)
Observations 358 357 358 357 357
Log6likelihood -218.8 -205.7 -222.4 -212.4 -209.8
Mean6dep6var 0.307 0.308 0.313 0.314 0.314
A.66Choice'Cash6 B.&6Choice'Voucher6
Dependent6variable:6Tournament6Entry
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compulsory tournament, risk tolerance, confidence, as well as unobserved treatment-
constant individual differences.5 The results in column 1 show that mothers, compared to 
fathers, are 10 percentage points (SE =0.045) more likely to compete when the prize is a 
voucher for their child, relative to their choices in the cash treatment. Column 2 of Table 2 
shows a nearly identical coefficient on the gender-treatment interaction when controlling 
for the interactions of treatment with willingness to pay for the voucher, score in the 
compulsory tournament, risk tolerance, and confidence.  In fact, these interactions terms are 
all insignificant, implying that, unlike gender, the effects of these variables on the choice to 
compete do not differ across treatments.   
The effect of greater female participation in the competition is that women went 
from being underrepresented among winners of the cash tournament (45%) to being slightly 
over-represented among winners of the voucher tournament (53%), with proportionate 
representation implying that 52% of the winners would be women.6  The voucher treatment 
eliminated the gender gap in winning the competition.  Robustness analysis reported in SI3 
rules out alternative interpretations based on mother and father differential selection into 
the experiment, the treatment order, or a higher valuation of vouchers by women.  
                                                
5 The results can be equivalently displayed using a first-difference model, as shown in Table S4 in SI. 
6 Women make up 55% of the winners in the compulsory tournament (Tournament). 
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Table 2. Tournament Entry Decision – Panel with Treatment Interactions. Linear regressions.  
Dependent variable = 1 if subject choses to compete; = 0 if subject choses not to compete.  Score 
refers to the score in the compulsory tournament.  Willingness to Pay refers to the willingness to 
pay for the voucher. Note that in column (1) the main effect of Female is absorbed by the subject 
fixed effects. Note that in column (2) the main effects of Female, Willingness to Pay, Score, Risk 
Tolerance, and Confidence are absorbed by the subject fixed effects.  Column (2) also controls for 
the interactions of multiple switching behavior in both the willingness to pay and the risk tolerance 
instruments with treatment.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10   
 
Unlike an intervention such as affirmative action (16), the voucher treatment does 
not change the probability of winning for either men or women conditional on entering the 
tournament, which prevents a more qualified man from being passed over in favor of a 
woman. Further analysis on the efficiency of child-benefitting incentives (here vouchers) is 
described in SI Table S6 and finds that the voucher treatment positively selects for high 
(1) (2)
Voucher,Treatment 20.046 20.050
(0.030) (0.067)
Female,×,Voucher,Treatment 0.100** 0.101**
(0.045) (0.046)
Willingness,to,Pay,×,Voucher,Treatment 0.001
(0.003)
Score,×,Voucher,Treatment 0.003
(0.007)
Risk,Tolerance,×,Voucher,Treatment 20.003
(0.003)
Confidence,×,Voucher,Treatment 20.003
(0.004)
Constant 0.307*** 0.308***
(0.011) (0.011)
Control,for,subject,fixed,effects YES YES
Observations 716 714
Number,of,Subjects 358 357
Table&2:&Tournament&Entry&Decision&5&Panel&with&Treatment&Interactions&
Dependent,variable:,Tournament,Entry
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ability people, male and female, and increases earnings for both males and females.  High 
ability women, in particular, increased their likelihood of tournament entry by 10 
percentage points under the voucher treatment (p-value=0.026), and saw their earnings 
increase by 8.5% (p-value=0.086). Men and low ability women are not affected in a 
statistically significant way.  We conclude that the voucher treatment increases equity 
without loss of efficiency.  
In conclusion, consistent with recent evolutionary theories of female competition 
(1), the experimental results indicate that a child-benefitting reward can trigger an increased 
desire in mothers to compete, compared to fathers, above their desire to compete for cash7. 
These findings suggest that policy interventions, other than affirmative action, may be 
effective in reducing inequality in the labor market: for instance, rewarding professional 
achievement with high quality on-site daycare, school vouchers, after school enrichment 
programs, tutor allowances, or more flexibility to reduce hours worked, which has been 
shown to correlate with lower gender gaps in earnings (20). As policy tools, child-
benefitting rewards could induce high ability women to enter more labor market 
competitions and earn more, without negative impacts on men and low ability women. 
                                                
7 Our findings are consistent with the results emerging from the negotiation literature in Psychology, 
according to which gender differences in negotiated outcomes are not due to internal traits (lower negotiation 
capacity or lower motivation), but to women negotiating economic outcomes simultaneously with seeking 
social approval and behaving strategically depending on the potential for backlash occurring in different 
contexts (29). According to these studies, women are fully aware of the potential for backlash when their 
assertive behavior could be viewed as incongruent with the prevailing gender norms and stereotypes. In 
contexts in which backlash is likely to occur (as in self-advocacy situations where negotiation is for oneself), 
women are shown to behave less assertively than in contexts in which there does not exist a violation of 
prevailing gender stereotypes (as in other-advocacy contexts where negotiations are on behalf of others). 
When negotiating on behalf of others, women are found to negotiate more assertively (as much as men) and 
achieve better outcomes, since they do not expect incongruity evaluations. Similar results have been found 
through incentivized economic experiments where competing in teams leads to a substantial reduction in the 
male–female competition gap (30).  
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Other desirable properties of such policy tools are discussed in SI 4. Importantly, the 
voucher treatment does not change the probability of winning in favor of one gender, 
conditional on entering the competition. This is a persistent source of concern with 
affirmative action interventions, which could be seen as unfair even if there are no ex-post 
adverse efficiency consequences (16). An intervention that preserves the conditional 
probability of winning may find more broad based support (31). 
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